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The idea for this paper was suggested, unwittingly to be sure,
by the Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin in his famous speech of September
27, 1965 inaugurating the Soviet Economic Reforms. Of the several
changes in directives given to enterprises which he announced, two are
relevant here: (1) The greater emphasis to be placed on profits,
and (2) the replacement of the output target by sales.
Taking advantage of the theorist's inherent right of simplification,
I would say that the enterprise manager (or director, as he is usually
called) was instructed to maximize an unspecified function of profits
and sales, subject to certain planning directives and several constraints
2)
which, though important in themselves, need not be considered here. '
I will argue in Part II that the maximization of a weighted sum of profits
and sales makes excellent sense when the enterprise is allowed to set
the prices of its outputs. It is not needed, however, if prices are set
by the State, as indeed they are in the Soviet Union. Under these
conditions, why was not the Manager given freedom of decision and
instructed to maximize profits only, in accordance with good old
economic theory, and without the additional directives and constraints?
I suspect that Mr. Kosygin's solution was not based on fine theoretical
considerations. ' Even if he sympathized with them (for which there is
little, if any, evidence), he would certainly be reluctant to abolish
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the planning mechanism and give complete freedom to Soviet enterprise
managers. There was no telling in what kind of wild ventures these
managers, unused to the freedom of the market, might get involved, and
through how many perturbations the economy would have to pass until some
reasonable equilibrium was achieved. Besides, Mr. Kosygin, like every-
one else, must have known that Soviet prices, based on a mark-up system
and usually unchanged for a number of years, do not equate demand and
A)
supply. ' When such prices are combined with excess demand, still common in
the Soviet economy, the maximization of profits by enterprises can lead
to all sorts of weird results.
The defects of the Soviet price system, like those of practically
any system of controlled prices, are too well known to require a long
discussion here. Let me merely mention two: (1) Unless all dimensions
of a commodity or of a service are specified explicitly -- a costly and
a laborious process -- its numerous characteristics cannot be controlled
by the single dimension of a price; its quality will deteriorate.
(2) The infrequency of Soviet price revisions discourages the introduction
of new products and of new models. A price set for a new commodity
normally covers the average cost of production (when large-scale output
begins), plus a modest markup. With time, the cost of production declines
due to the learning process and similar reasons -- there is little wage
inflation in the Soviet Union. The old product becomes highly profitable.
The manager has no incentive to replace it with a new one, subject to
5)
that modest profit margin. ' More frequent price revisions are of course
costly. In spite of the present trend toward re-centralization, a day
will surely come when Soviet planners will have to delegate at least
some price-setting rights to the producers. Hungary has already made some
progress in this direction.
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But price-setting by producers involves at least two dangers:
inflation and monopoly. On inflation I have little to say here, except
to suggest that 1t can be avoided if the planners achieve a reasonable
macro-balance and retain some control over wages, or at least prevent
their labor unions from behaving like ours. It is not that I underestimate
the difficulties of controlling inflation: this paper simply deals with
a different subject. It is concerned with the second hazard -- monopoly
power. The high concentration of control over Industry in Eastern Europe,
the strong affection for large-scale enterprises by socialist planners,
and the small size of European socialist countries, with the single
exception of the Soviet Union, would allow the producers and their
organizations to exercise monopoly powers beyond the fondest dream of
any Wall -Street operator. Of course, the control over Industry could be
reorganized; perhaps even anti-trust departments could be set up in
the respective ministries of justice — it takes some imagination to
visualize that — and imports could be used to break monopoly power.
But this last weapon, perhaps the most effective of them all, requires
ample supplies of foreign exchange. Even then, would socialist managers
and workers welcome foreign competition any more enthusiastically than
do their capitalist colleagues?
I think it is safe to conclude that if socialist managers are
given freedom of decision and are encouraged to maximize profits under
a market system of prices set by themselves, monopolistic and oligopolistic
practices will abound. But perhaps Mr. Kosygln's suggestion can be
utilized to express their instructions 1n some other, still reasonably
practical way, to make them behave 1n a more socially-desired manner.
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II
We shall first consider an enterprise producing only one output
and then proceed to the general case with any number of inputs and
outputs. We shall assume that the Manager has the ability and all the
necessary information about demand and cost schedules to maximize total
profit within his time horizon if that was his objective. That is,
for ewery planned range of output he would choose the lowest-cost
technology and input combination, and then proceed to the intersection
of the marginal cost and marginal revenue curves, as shown by the solid
lines on the three diagrams which we all learned in our first course in
economics. (The schedules are represented by straight lines in Pigs. 1
and 2 only because straight lines are easier to draw.) How he gets
this information, whether he takes the mode or the mean or some other
moment of a probability distribution, how he protects himself against
uncertainty in general, and how he deals with the complexities of
oligopolistic strategy is none of our concern, though we'll have to
return to oligopoly briefly 1n Part IV. The important point is that
the change in his instructions to be suggested presently will not call
for any additional information or any extra ability on his part.
Now, the Planner, as we shall call the official who determines
the rules and who desires an optimal allocation of resources, wants the
Manager to set his output price at point A where marginal cost equals
price. ' The trouble is that the Planner does not know the position
of A. (Even if he did, he would still have to find some method,
hopefully other than a direct order, to Induce the Manager to move there.)
The Planner does know, however, that if the Manager was maximizing
total profit he would be at some point D, to the left of A. He also
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knows that if the Manager was instructed to maximize total sales he would
move to the right of A.' Thus -- and this is the central point of
this paper -- profits in the objective function move the Manager to
the left, and sales -- to the right of A along the demand curve.
Surely, there must exist some combination of profit and sales which
would induce the Manager to operate at point A. But first, a few
mathematical symbols.
LIST OF SYMBOLS (In order of Appearance)
B the Manager's bonus
u_, v parameters
N_ net profit (before the bonus)
R revenue or sales
p_ price
x output
C total cost
E_ elasticity, usually of demand
n_ number of outputs, or of inputs and outputs
E elasticity of supply
z
u+v
u
N* adjusted net profit (with shadow prices)
c^ corporate income tax rate
t time (in adjustment units)
means optimal
The symbols '_ and 1 indicate first and second derivatives 1n
respect to x_.
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Let us assume that the Planner offers the Manager a bonus which
the Manager is absolutely determined to maximize (both for the sake
of income and as a success indicator). Let this bonus consist of a
weighted sum of profits and of sales:
(1) B = uN + vR = u(px-C) + vpx = (u+v)px - uC.
To maximize it, differentiate jMn respect to x and equate the
derivative to zero:
(2) #= (u+v)(p + xfe - uC = 0,
(3) P V u+v \AJ
37" ^ UTVMfJ T V
which yields
where E = •£ ? £ is of course the elasticity of demand. '
But the Planner wants the price to equal marginal cost:
(4) p-C.
Hence u^ and v should be chosen 1n such a way that
(5)
(¥>fl)" "
'
which, after a few simple manipulations, reduces to
(6) ^=-(E+l),
the E indicating here the demand elasticity at the optimal point A
the location of which is still unknown.
If the enterprise produces several outputs x, , Xg, .. ., x^ and
sets the corresponding prices of p_, , p^, ..., p^, the bonus should be
expressed as
n
(7) B - uN + 7 v
i
x
1
p
1
.
By taking partial derivatives in respect to x^ and equating them to
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zero we again obtain the result that
(8) $ =- (E1+l),
but with the very Important qualification that the cross-elastl cities
of demand are sufficiently small to be disregarded . Otherwise the
Cj refuse to cancel out, and the mathematical solution 1s too complex
for practical use. This means that the parameters v., cannot be
set separately for each product, but must be applied to the total out-
put of each department of the enterprise, the departments being arranged
in such a way as to make the Inter-departmental cross elasticities
of demand negligible. From an administrative point of view this may
be even an advantage: the Planner would undoubtedly prefer not to have
to compute demand elasticities for each model of say, General Motors
cars, to give an American example. But 1t might be difficult to divide
General Motors Into proper departments because of the continuous characteristics,
so to speak of its outputs. It is unlikely that Chevrolets compete with
Cadillacs directly. But Chevrolets compete with Pontiacs, Pontiacs with
Bulcks, and Buicks with Cadillacs. Where are we to draw the line? It
may be necessary to put all General Motors cars Into one department,
while trucks, Diesel engines, refrigerators, etc., each comprise a separate
one. As a result, the ratios ^ will correspond not to the actual demand
elasticities for specific commodities but to their weighted average.
Hence, products whose elasticities are higher than the average for the
department,will be over-produced, and the others — produced below the
optimum. It 1s highly unlikely, however, that demand elasticities
can be estimated with much precision even under the best of circumstances.
So all we can expect from our bonus scheme 1s a movement to some
10
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approximation of the optimal output. '
Expressions (6) and (8) give only the relative magnitudes of u
and v : they do not of course determine the absolute size of the bonus
which the Planner will presumably set according to some other cons Iderati 6ns.
The whole scheme will make no sense if |E| <_ 1. Direct price
regulation (perhaps similar to that practiced in our public utilities)
would be required. Actually, many demand elasticities need not be
particularly low because they pertain not to the demand for the whole
industry but only to that for the individual enterprise.
To obtain some idea about the composition of the bonus, let us
take a demand elasticity as high as -4. Set v = 1 per cent, and u = 3
per cent (as given by expression (6)) and assume sales of 1000 and a
net profit of 100 (a 10 per cent profit margin seems reasonable). Then
the bonus will equal 3% x 100 + 1% x 1000 = 3 + 10 « 13. Note that more
than three-quarters of this bonus (77 per cent) are derived from sales.
Even with E_= -6, two- thirds of the bonus still come from that source.
And these are high elasticities. If the profit margin was only 5 per
cent, the corresponding shares would be even higher -- 37 and 80 per
cent. Mr. Kosygin certainly had a point.
Monopsony can be handled in exactly the same manner, except that
in expression (1) the parameter v is applied not to sales, but to,
say, the payroll, if labor is the factor subject to monopsonistic
exploitation. But because payroll is an expenditure rather than a
receipt the ratio u/j/ takes the form of
<»> $-*,.!.
again on the condition that the cross-elasticities, this time of the
supplies of inputs, can be neglected. A solution for any number of
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inputs and outputs with a generalized production function 1s given
in the Mathematical Note, but because of the close analogy between
the cases of monopoly and monopsony the latter will be omitted from
the subsequent discussion.
Ill
It now remains to find the correct elasticity of demand. If this
elasticity is constant, at least 1n the relevant range, let us hope that
it can be estimated. But it need not be constant. It 1s the elasticity
at (or near) point A that the Planner needs. Yet all available empirical
data will pertain to the region around point D if sales were not
previously included in the bonus function, or around some other point
on the demand curve 1f the bonus was set incorrectly, or if the demand
and/or the cost curves shifted since the bonus had been arranged. How
can the Planner discover that the bonus, as 1t 1s presently composed, 1s wrong
and ascertain in what direction it should be changed? How can he Induce
the Manager to operate at point A when he does not know where this point
1s?
Two cases will be considered, depending on whether the (absolute
magnitude of the) elasticity of demand declines or rises with Increasing
output.
1. Declining Elasticity of Demand . Assume that the bonus scheme
has been in operation for some time, and that the Manager 1s now at some
point G.j on the demand curve as shown 1n Figs. 1 and 2. The Planner
knows x-j and p^ at 6^ and the current bonus ratio arranged previously
which we shall call u/v . By assumption, he can estimate E_, as well.
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Comparing u/v with the u/v-
j
which would correspond to E_, he finds
u/v > u/v-|. This tells him that point G, is to the left of A, a
piece of information which, while not absolutely necessary, is convenient
to have. ' He now sets a new u/v, = -(E_, + 1).
It will now be convenient to introduce a new parameter z = .—
.
By definition.^ any point on the demand curve,
(10) z =
-r = Hn v = -Sr - * •
Thus
(11) z^j = Pl ,
i.e. z,R' passes through point G,.
The maximizing equation (2) can be rewritten as
(12) zR' = C.
This expression shows that our bonus scheme 1s simply a device for
inducing the Manager, in his quest for the largest reward, to maximize
an adjusted profit N* = zp_x_ - C which determines his bonus. Mathematically
speaking, this is a better scheme because it uses only one parameter
z instead of our two — u_ and v (see the Mathematical Note). I think,
however, that practical people (capitalist or socialist) will be more
at home with a bonus expressed in terms of conventional profits and
sales rather than with one based on a price adjustment. In either
case, the Manager will work with adjusted marginal revenue curves
zR' and equate them to C ' . A family of such curves for particular
values of z is represented by the dotted lines GHK and IJK on F1gs.
1 and 2. They all meet the original R' curve (corresponding to z = 1)
at K where R' = 0.
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It can be shown that point (L, will lie between G, and A, that
is that the method of setting the bonus described here will result
in a non-oscillatory movement converging on A. In the linear case
represented on Figs. 1 and 2 this is obvious. A general proof is
given in the Mathematical Note.
After the Manager moved to point G^, the Planner, having collected
sufficient information about L, at G_
2
and finding that it does not
correspond to z, will calculate a new z~ and change the bonus accordingly.
The Manager will now move to point G_
3
between Go and A, and so on.
Only when the Planner ascertains that a newly calculated £ corresponds
to a previously set z_ does he know that the Manager has indeed reached
the optimal point A where zR' = p_ = C_'
.
If the Manager's original position was at J, to the right of A_,
the same method of successive bonus adjustments would move him left-
ward toward A.
The negative slope of the marginal cost curve 1n Fig. 2 creates
no problems in this respect, so long as the stability conditions are
satisfied, but it test call for one more decision: either the enter-
prise will have to be subsidized or the price will have to be set
at some multiple or marginal cost by changing equation (4) accordingly —
a subject amply discussed in welfare economics.
Thus our method, which may be called the "Simple Rule", does
result in convergence without oscillations. But the speed of con-
vergence remains unknown. An experienced Planner may improve on it
by making stronger adjustments (in either direction), and thus sending
the Manager to point A with fewer iterations. These must be disturbing
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to the Manager and particularly to his customers. But the Planner
should take care not to overshoot. His reputation may be at stake.
£#—
- 2. Increasing Elasticity of Demand . R.G.D. Allen regards this an
"abnormal" case, at least by implication. ' I hope that it is most
uncommon in practice.
A demand curve with an increasing (in absolute magnitude) E
is presented on Fig. 3. We again start at point G, and try to apply
the Simple Rule. Unfortunately, as shown on F1g. 3 and 1n the Mathematical
12}
Note, this Rule results in oscillations around A. ' On Fig. 3 the
process converges (and rather rapidly at that), but this need not
always be true. Even if 1t does, a practical Planner will be reluctant
to use the Simple Rule because of the oscillations. To avoid them,
he will have to dilute the Rule. Suppose that the original ^ was
set at 1.10 while the z, corresponding to E_, at point G, 1s 1.18.
The Planner sets the new z_ at 1.13 or even at 1.12 and watches the
Manager's moves before making another change. I have not been able
to devise a simple general method for dealing with this unusual
case and I doubt that further effort is worth while. Let us hope
13)
that the Planner learns from experience. '
IV
The practical application of our method merely calls for periodic,
perhaps annual, checks whether the u/v_ ratio (or the z) as it appears
in the bonus corresponds to the E of the Manager's present position,
and for an adjustment of this ratio when a significant discrepancy
is found. More frequent changes would be irritating both to the
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Manager and to his customers. On the other hand, 1f the u[v_ ratio
is changed infrequently, it may pay a group of managers to engage
in fictitious sales with one another. ' Hence some check of the
sales record of the enterprise and of its profit/sales ratio may be
required.
It is important to assure the Manager that the absolute size of
his bonus is little affected by changes in the u/y_ ratio. Otherwise,
the Manager, whose knowledge and intelligence need not be inferior
to the Planner's, and who can readily figure out the Planner's
rules, will be tempted to pursue a game strategy against the
Planner. It may pay the Manager not to maximize his bonus at a given
moment either inthe hope that a change in the u/v^ ratio will increase
his bonus or for the fear that it will diminish 1t. Hence the Manager
may not be in the position dictated by the current \xjs_ ratio, a
situation that may mislead the Planner and possibly lead to wrong
15)
adjustments. ' It may even cause instability. Further
exploration of this potentially exciting process I will leave to
connoisseurs of game theory.
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All these suggestions are based on the optimistic assumption
that the elasticity of demand (in the relevant range) can be estimated
with some tolerable degree of accuracy and that both the Planner and the
Manager arrive at the same estimate. (If the absolute size of the
bonus is made reasonably Independent of u/v , there is no reason for
excluding consultations.) In respect to simple monopoly this
assumption can probably be justified, but surely demand elasticity
becomes a rather elusive concept under conditions of oligopolistic
competition -- a much more frequent case. Is the Planner to assume
that his managers act independently of one another, or that they enter
into, possibly secret, collusive agreements? Even if he can estimate
the E for the industry as a whole, can he really approximate it for
each Individual enterprise, dependent as its E_ is on the actions of
its competitors? If problems of static oligopolistic price-setting
are very complex (and I have no desire to discuss them here),
do not they become unmanageable in the presence of technological
progress?
There are two answers to these objections: First, the
needed elasticities pertain not the specific products,
but to departments of an enterprise (see Part II). Demand for their out-
puts in the aggregate should be more stable than that for individual
18
products. Second — and more important — do we have better alternatives?
The defects of profit maximization as an instrument for achieving
an optimal allocation of resources are well known. Nevertheless,
it seems to me that Soviet experience clearly shows that this very
imperfect method is still the best available, at least for the normal
operations of an ordinary enterprise. (Large investment decisions
are a different matter.) If an effective policy of price control
without the usual difficulties (see Part I) could be devised, the
Manager should be Instructed to maximize profit without much ado.
But for most goods and services a satisfactory policy of this kind
has not yet been Invented. It seems better then to let the Manager
(except 1n special sectors) set his own prices. But if sales are not
included in his instructions and/or in his bonus function, this is
tantamount to the assumption of an infinite elasticity of demand.
Surely more realistic assumptions can be made.
Perhaps the skeptical Planner may be persuaded, at the beginning,
to set the u/y_ ratio in each industry in such a manner that the profit
component in managerial bonuses approximately equals that of sales.
With the profit/sales ratio of 10 percent which we used previously
(it varies among industries and enterprises), this amounts to the
assumption that £= -11; with a 5 percent markup, £= -21, surely
generous overestimates. Perhaps the profit component should be made
equal to half of that of sales. This would still Imply high elasticities:
-6 and -11 respectively. In time, differentiated ratios adjusted
to the characteristics of the various Industries and firms could be
worked out, even if the Planner did not follow each step of the
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fascinating process described in Part III.
But even if the Planner still rejects the bonus idea as being
impractical, not everything is lost. He should at least make the Manager
understand that his performance is evaluated by the Planner not only on
the basis of profit but also of sales. So if a report of rising sales
brings about a broad smile on the Planner's face, the Manager, a professional
person interested in promoting his career, may well behave as if sales
were indeed included in his bonus formula. But the Planner, only a
human being, may not always show the right breadth of a smile, and the
Manager, another human being, may not always know how to quantify it.
The inclusion of sales in the bonus need not be limited to a
socialist manager. It can be applied to the compensation of any
decision-maker who has monopolistic (or monopsonistic) powers, as for
instance to that of a head of a department of a vertically integrated
capitalist corporation. ' The principle can also be used a general
anit-monopoly measure by taxing profits at the rate g_ and subsidizing
sales (or certain purchases) at the rate of v, the (1 - q)/v ratio
being determined by the elasticity of demand (or supply). But even if
such a flexible tax-subsidy policy could be used in a country like France^
I doubt that the American legal system would tolerate it. For that matter,
strange as it may seem, we may not need it. For if Professor Galbraith
and others are right in asserting that sales are included in the objective
functions of large corporations, the problem of monopolistic pricing
may have already been solved, or at least seriously mitigated. In
18)
our modern industrial state wonders never cease.
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MATHEMATICAL NOTE
Assumptions: (i) Demand and cost function are monotonic and
twice different!' able in the relevant range. (2) p*. < if x. is an output, p! >
if x. is an input. (3) p_ intersects C' in a single point A in the region
where |E| > 1. Hence it follows from the simple monopoly maximizing
equation p_ + xp_' = C ' that p_ > C_' at point D and between D and A
and p_ < C to the right of A.
To Part II . Second-order conditions for profit maximization under
ordinary monopoly are R" < C". The differentiation of equation (2)
in the text expresses these conditions as zR_" < C\ Hence, if R" <
stability is reinforced. But if R" > (which may happen with increasing
|E_|), a previously stable situation may become unstable.
In the general case,
n
N = T p
1
x
1
(i = 1, ..., n)(13)
and
n
(14) B = I (u+vjp.x.
1
subject to the production function
(15) f(xr ..., xn )
= 0.
Using Lagrangian multiplier X form
n
(16) Y = l (u+v
1
)p
i
x
1
- xf(xr ..., xn )
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Differentiate (16) in respect to x. and equate to zero:
x. ap.
(17) p< u+viW 1 + p7-
4
] = xf.
3Pi
provided of course that -r-— = for j_ f j
.
3X
j
* f
i
(18) p = r— .
(u+v.j)(l + £)
i
It is desired that prices should be proportional to the respective
rates of transformation in production:
Pi f i
(19) r-= T- for all land j..P
J*
Substituting (19) into (18) yields
(20) (u+v.)(l + ~) = (u+v 4 )(l + J-) for all 1 and j.
The solution given by expression (8) in the text is
(21) £ (E, + 1).
v
i
It can be easily ascertained that (21) satisfies equation (20), because
(21) implies for all i_ and j_
(22) (u+vJO + jl-) = u = (u+Vi )(l + i- )
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The condition (21) is not the only solution which satisfies (20).
The latter expression says that the manager will produce (or buy)
the proper amounts (and charge or pay the proper prices) provided
the (u_ + v.) are inversely proportional to the respective (1 +i—).
As was already mentioned in the text regarding expression (12), (u_ + v.) can be
regarded as price-adjusting weights transforming our bonus scheme
into an ordinary profit maximization with shadow prices defined as
Pi
Note that if x, is an output, v. >_ 0, provided |E.| > 1. If
x. is an input v., £ because Inputs have negative signs.
To Part III. 1. Declining |E|. 19 ' The Simple Rule implies the following
sequence of bonus ratios and outputs:
(23) z - x
}
•> Z] - x
2
...z
t_ 1
- x
t
- z
t
- x
t+1
...
A larger z means a greater relative weight given to sales. Hence if
z. > z., , x_.
+
, > x_
t ,
and because of the declining |Ej if
^t+1
> *% » It+1 > zt .
By definition of z given in (10),
Pt
( 24 > zt
=
^7 *R
t
- 23 -
Since z_
t
determines x
t+ -| ,
the maximizing equation (12) can be expressed as
C
(25) z. = rt^1 ,t R
t+1
and
(26) z
t.,
- \,
As explained in the text, the Planner, starting from x, < x
activates the adjustment process by setting z, > z
.
Therefore
—i
—
o
*g >
-1 ' *-2
>
-1 and in 9enera ^ i-t >
-t-1 •
From ( 24 ) and ( 26 )»
< 27 > u~
s ^- > 1 -L
t
z
t-l
Thus p_. > C* . , and no overshooting takes place. Conversely, so long
as p_t
> C'
t
,
z. > z_
t _-|
; the process continues until p. = C ' at
A. This means convergence without oscillations.
A similar process, but 1n reverse takes place when at the start
x, > x
.
2. Increasing |Ej. The application of the Simple Rule still gives
x_
t+
, > x
t
if z
t
> z*,, but unfortunately z_.
+1
< z_. if x.
+ ^
> x_
t
because of increasing | E_| So if x. < x, z. > z_._-| and x. + ^ > x_t ,
but from (24) and (26),
(28) fttL = f|±l < 1,
U
t+1
Z
t
and oscillations around A are inevitable. Convergence is not assured.
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NOTES
*A number of persons have contributed to the development of this
paper. My M.I.T. students and listeners elsewhere have allowed me to try
these ideas on them for a number of years. L. Dwight Israelsen helped
with the research; John Broome and my colleague Professor Martin L.
Weitzman improved the mathematics; Professors Michael Manove and Abram
Bergson made many helpful comments. Professor Karl G. Jungenfelt of
the Stockholm School of Economics raised a number of questions which
made me re-work the whole paper and develop Part III. He also suggested
an alternative method of setting the managerial bonus which he may
wish to develop on his own. My expression of gratitude to all these
persons does not of course make them accomplices 1n my mistakes.
I am also grateful to the Stockholm School of Economics for the
use of its facilities during the Spring 1972 term and to the National
Science Foundation (Grant NSF-GS-2627) for its financial support.
1. His speech was originally published in Pravda and Izvestiia
on September 28, 1965. English translations can be found in The
Current Digest of Soviet Press , Vol. 17, No. 38 (October 13, 1965),
pp. 3-12; in Problems of Economics , Vol. 8 (October, 1965), pp. 3-28;
and in Morris Bornstein and Daniel R. Fusfeld, The Soviet Economy :
A Book of Readings , Third Edition (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin,
Inc., 1970), pp. 387-96. The latter version is somewhat abbreviated.
Many comments and analyses of his speech have been published.
See for instance Gertrude E. Schroeder, "Soviet Economic 'Reform': A
Study in Contradictions," Soviet Studies, Vol. 20 (July, 1968), pp. 1-21.
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For the discussions preceding the reforms, see Jere L. Felker, Soviet
Economic Controversies (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1966).
2. The most important constraints were the "major assortment"
of sales and a maximum payroll limitation which was expected to remain
in force until a more adequate supply of consumer goods was achieved.
Direct orders from the authorities to the managers have never disappeared
and have become more frequent in recent years. There has been a return
to centralization.
An investigation of the actual objective function of a Soviet
enterprise would require a separate paper, and probably more than one.
To put it briefly, much emphasis has been placed in recent years on the
Material Incentive Fund from which bonuses not only to the manager
but also to his staff, workers and employees are paid. The Fund is
calculated by multiplying the wage fund of the enterprise by a ratio
obtained from a formula containing a number of variables, such as
increase in sales, rate of profit on capital, planned production of
new products as a fraction of total production, improvement in labor
productivity and so on. It seems that when the authorities decide to
correct some particular deficiency, such as low labor productivity,
they make a corresponding change 1n the Incentive Fund formula. It
also differs among industries and enterprises. See Michael Ellman,
Soviet Planning Today: Proposals for an Optimally Functioning Economic
System (Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp. 131-62; Bertrand N. Horwitz,
Accounting Controls and the Soviet Economic Reforms of 1966 (American
Accounting Association, 1970); S.I. Shkurko, Material' noe Stimuli rovanie
v Novykh Uslovifaih KhoziaT'stvovanifa (Moscow: MisV, 1970).
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3. It is quite possible that his decision was simply a compromise,
so common in governmental circles, between the advocates of managerial
freedom via profits and the proponents of central control via sales.
4. It seems that Mr. Kosygin did not wish prices to clear the
market. Instead "Prices ... must cover production and turnover outlays
and secure the profits of each normally functioning enterprise."
Bornsteln and Fusfeld, op.cit.
, p. 395. Note that President Nixon's
Price Control Board also follows this doctrine. Perhaps a governmental
body is incapable of regulating prices 1n any other way.
5. Note that wage inflation, that is, wage rates rising faster than
labor productivity, would produce an opposite result: the enterprise
would be delighted to produce a "new" product to get a new price higher
than the original one — the usual effect of price control during Inflation.
In the capitalist world, firms are anxious to produce something that
is or looks new in order to enjoy temporary monopoly gains from higher
prices until their competitors catch up.
As was stated in Note 2, the proportion of output represented
by new products is explicitly included in some of the Incentive Fund
formulas.
6. In assuming that the Planner does want the Manager to be at
the socially optimal point A I am merely following the tradition.
But the Planner may have his own motivations and Incentives which may
or may not be socially desirable. Perhaps this question deserves
greater attention than 1t has received in the literature so far.
7. On Figs. 1 and 2, where demand elasticity declines to the
right, maximization of sales would be achieved at point T_ because
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there demand elasticity equals -1 and the marginal revenue 1s zero. On
Fig. 3, the rising demand elasticity provides no maximum point for sales.
8. The second-order conditions are given in the Mathematical Note.
9. In case of a discriminating monopoly the u/v ratios will have
to be differentiated among the several markets. This point was made
by Lars Jonung of the University of Lund.
10. Another way of ascertaining that the Manager 1s to the left
of point A 1s by finding the p/C ratio from expression (3). But if
this ratio, or more exactly, C|_ at G, can be calculated why does not
the Planner simply order the Manager to set the price and output
accordingly without bothering about a particular bonus scheme? First,
C_^ at 6, is not the marginal cost that the Planner needs. To get
from G, to A a number of Iterations would be needed which may prove to
be oscillatory (on F1g. 1 for instance). Second, such a direct order
would merely follow the present Soviet practice of price and quantity
controls with all its defects.
11. R.G.D. Allen, Mathematical Analysis for Economists (New
York: The Macmillan Co., 1939), pp. 257-58.
12. The zR' may not even intersect the C' curve at all. See
the stability conditions 1n the Mathematical Note.
13. I have not presented a diagram showing a combination of
increasing |E_| with a declining marginal cost. This combination has
a good chance of being unstable.
14. I was once told 1n Bogota, Colombia about a pair of businessmen,
one in Colombia and the other 1n Peru, who kept sending hides to each
other in order to profit from special foreign exchange rates. Of course
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the hides never left either country; only papers were sent back and
forth
.
15. Much will depend on the Planner's ability in estimating
£ and on his faith in his own estimates. The scheme will miscarry
if the Manager's estimates of E are different from those of the
Planner (see below). But if the Manager does not maximize the bonus
at all our whole scheme should be abandoned.
16. It goes without saying that many enterprises, particularly
in such fields as education, public health, cultural activities and
perhaps in urban transportation need not make any profits. Qualifications
arising from external effects are too well known to require comment.
17. That marginal costs, particularly in the absence of market
prices, should be the basis of transfer prices is well recognized
in the literature. See for Instance Jack Hirshlelfer, "On the Economics
of Transfer Pricing," The Journal of Business , Vol. 29 (July, 1956),
pp. 172-84 and his "Economics of the D1vis1onalized Firm," same
Journal, Vol. 30 (April, 1957), pp. 96-108. It would be interesting
to find out what specific incentives, if any, are offered to managers
of departments to make them adhere to this policy.
In general, the instructions given to managers of branches or
departments of capitalist firms, the evaluation of these managers'
performance, the nature of their compensation, the delegation of
powers to them, and similar subjects should be of great Interest to
researchers on socialist countries.
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18. John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1967, 1971, pp. 171-77. See Also William J.
Baumol , Business Behavior, Value and Growth , Revised Edition,
(New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1967), pp. 45-63, 68-77,
96-103.
19. This is a modified version of a proof suggested by my
colleague Professor Martin L. Weitzman. It is clearer and more
rigorous than the one contained in an earlier draft of this paper.
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